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Abstract
Standard economic models are based on axioms that epitomize the fundamen-
tal behavioral assumptions. This approach is not conductive to convincing
results. The suggested change of perspective is guided by the question: what
is the minimum set of propositions for the consistent reconstruction of the
evolving money economy? We start with three structural axioms and deter-
mine their real world implications. The claim of generality entails that it
should be possible to demonstrate that well-understood parts of theoretical
economics fit consistently into the structural axiomatic framework. We focus
here on the classical theory of value as expounded by J. S. Mill.
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J. S. Mill clearly enunciated the question than stands at the beginning of any and
every scientific inquiry:
What are the propositions which may reasonably be received without
proof? That there must be some such propositions all are agreed, since
there cannot be an infinite series of proof, a chain suspended from
nothing. But to determine what these propositions are, is the opus
magnum of the more recondite mental philosophy. (Mill, 2006b, p.
746), original emphasis
Where and when the axiomatic method originated is uncertain. We know about it
particularly from Euclid. It is certain, however, that in economics axiomatization
commenced with Adam Smith (Hollander, 1977) and Senior:
It [the axiomatic method] was introduced to economics in A.D. 1836 by
Nassau William Senior in his Outline of the Science of Political Econ-
omy and is today more or less consciously adopted by most economic
theorists as the way of theorizing in economics. (Stigum, 1991, p. 4)
Euclid’s path runs through the classical school (Halévy, 1960, p. 494), the neoclas-
sical school (Jevons, 1911, p. 21) and reached an unprecedented level of Walrasian
abstraction in the 1960s (Debreu, 1959, p. x). Whether the project of Wald, von
Neumann, Debreu, Arrow, Hahn, McKenzie, and others (Ingrao and Israel, 1990),
(Leonhard, 1995),(Weintraub, 1998) has met with success is no longer an open
question. It is plain that ‘anything based on this mock-up is unlikely to fly’ (Hahn,
1981, p. 1036), see also (Ackerman, 2004), (Kirman, 1989, p. 126).
Keynes, as so often, perspicuously articulated the challenge:
The classical theorists resemble Euclidean geometers in a non-
Euclidean world . . . . Yet, in truth, there is no remedy except to throw
over the axiom of parallels and to work out a non-Euclidean geometry.
Something similar is required to-day in economics. (Keynes, 1973, p.
16)
The crucial point is not axiomatization per se but the choice of axioms. One cannot
not axiomatize but one can practice it imaginatively or mechanically, rigorously
or sloppily, systematically or haphazardly, precisely to the point or beside it. As
Clower put it:
My opinion continues to be that axiomatics, like every other tool of
science, is no better than its user, and not all users are skilled. (Clower,
1995, p. 308)
The thesis to start with suggests itself: neither neoclassical nor Keynesian economics
possess a qualified axiomatic basis. Heterodox economists as complementary group
mostly rebut the ‘deductivist Euclidean methodology’ recommend a more pluralistic
approach, and propose to give up the ‘Euclidean hope’ (PålssonSyll, 2010, p. 52).
2
But from the argument that the neoclassical behavioral axioms are unqualified
does not logically follow that the axiomatic method is defective. An outstanding
proponent of axiomatization like Poincaré simply did not accept Walras’s hypotheses
of selfishness and farsightedness as axioms (Kirman, 2009, p. 82). It only follows
that some economists have not applied the method correctly, for whatever reasons
(Hudson, 2010, p. 15-16). The point at issue is the real world content of axioms.
The second thesis says: human behavior does not yield to the axiomatic method.
A behavioral axiom is a methodological oxymoron (cf. Cairnes 1875, pp. iv-v).
Yet the axiomatization of the economy’s basic structure is feasible. Accordingly,
the objective is to establish a formalism of maximum structural simplicity and
generality. We start with an axiom set that is free of any behavioral specifications
and subsequently approach the complexity of the real world by a process of con-
sistent differentiation. The claim of generality entails that it should be possible
to demonstrate that some well-understood parts of theoretical economics can be
explicitly connected to the structural axiom set. We focus here on J. S. Mill, ‘the
most distinguished expositor’ (Cairnes) of the classical theory of value, because he
holds a nodal position at the crossroad of economic theory and methodology. Mill’s
answer, to be sure, is historical. His question, though, how it comes about that the
value of commodities most of the time exceeds their cost of production and thereby
keeps the market system going is topical.
The present paper has two parts. In the first, the logical interdependencies of
the key variables that formally embody the business and the household sector and
the markets in between are expounded. In the second, the real world implications
with regard to the theory of value are made explicit. The analytical starting point
is given with the structural axiom set in section 1. In sections 2 to 6 the structural
value theorem, the profit ratio, and the rate of interest are derived for the competitive
structure. The congruence and difference with the classical labour theory of value is
highlighted. Section 7 concludes.
Although Mill propagated the axiomatic method he actually neither formalized
his behavioral principle nor the theory of value. Hence Mill offers the starting point
for both behavioral and structural axiomatization. The one route has been taken by
neoclassical economists the other is followed here.
1 Axioms and Definitions
The first three axioms relate to income, production, and expenditures in a period of
arbitrary length. For the remainder of this inquiry the period length is conveniently
assumed to be the calendar year. It can be shown that the applicability of the
axiom set does not depend on the chosen period length. Simplicity demands that
we have at first one world economy, one firm, and one product. Quantitative and
qualitative differentiation is obviously the next logical step after having worked out
the implications of the following three axioms.
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Total income of the household sector Y is the sum of wage income, i.e. the
product of wage rate W and total working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the
product of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Yt =WtLt +DtNt (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working
hours.
Ot = RtLt (2)
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P
and quantity bought X.
Ct = PtXt (3)
A set of axioms cannot be assessed ex ante; it is a tentative formal starting
point. The assessment comes on the next stage with the interpretation of the
logical implications of the formal world and the comparison with selected data
and phenomena of the real world. Axioms should have an intuitive economic
interpretation (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 2007, p. 25). The economic meaning
is rather obvious for the set of structural axioms. What deserves mention is that
total income in eq. (1) is the sum of wage income and distributed profit and not of
wage income and profit. Profit and distributed profit are quite different things that
have to be thoroughly kept apart.
By choosing objective structural relationships as axioms behavioral hypotheses
are not ruled out. On the contrary, the structural axiom set is open to any behavioral
assumption and not restricted to the standard optimization calculus.
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side
of the identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms (Boylan and
O’Gorman, 2007, p. 431). They add no content to the set of axioms but merely
facilitate the use of symbols. New variables are introduced with new axioms. With
(4) factor income YF, which is at the moment identical with wage income, and
distributed profit income YD is defined:
YF t ≡WtLt YDt ≡ DtNt (4)
With (5) the expenditure ratio rE, the sales ratio rX, the distributed profit ratio
rD, and the factor cost ratio rF is defined:
ρE t ≡ CtYt ρX t ≡
Xt
Ot
ρDt ≡ YDtYW t ρF t ≡
Wt
PtRt
(5)
The axioms and definitions are consolidated to one single equation:
ρF ρE (1+ρD)
ρX
= 1 |t (6)
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The period core (6) as absolute formal minimum determines the interdepen-
dencies of the measurable key ratios for each period. The period core is purely
structural, i.e. free of any behavioral assumptions, unit-free1 because all real and
nominal dimensions cancel out, and contingent. Contingency means that it is open
until explicitly stated which of the variables are independent and which is depen-
dent. The form of eq. (6) precludes any notion of causality; it simply states the
interdependence of the key ratios.
The factor cost ratio summarizes the internal conditions of the firm. A value of
rF <1 signifies that the real wage is lower than the productivity or, in other words,
that unit wage costs are lower than the price or, in still other words, that the value of
output exceeds the value of input. In this case the profit per unit is positive. Then
we have the conditions in the product market. An expenditure ratio rE =1 indicates
that consumption expenditures are equal to income and a value of rX =1 of the sales
ratio means that the quantities produced and sold are equal in period t or, in other
words, that the product market is cleared. In the special case rE =1 and rX =1, that
invokes the notion of an equilibrium with market clearing and budget balancing, the
profit per unit is determined solely by the distributed profit ratio rD. In one sentence:
the period core covers the key ratios about the firm, the market, and the income
distribution and determines their interdependencies. The period core represents the
pure consumption economy, that is, no investment expenditures, no foreign trade,
and no taxes or any other state activity.
2 The Structural Value Theorem
The axioms and definitions have first to be differentiated for two firms. This formal
exercise is referred to the appendix. For the relative prices of two products then
follows directly from eq. (43) in combination with (35):
P1
P2
=
R2
R1
L2
L1
C1
C2
if ρX1 = ρX2 = 1 |t (7)
If the markets for both products are cleared the price ratio is inversely pro-
portional to the ratio of productivities and the ratio of labor inputs and directly
proportional to the ratio of the consumption expenditures for the two products. This
implicates a soft budget constraint, that is, the sum of consumption expenditures
C1+C2 needs in the general case not be equal to income Y. For the special case of
budget balancing, i.e. rE1+ rE2=1, it follows from eq. (7):
P1
P2
=
O2
O1
1
1
ρE1
−1
if ρX1 = ρX2 = 1 |t (8)
1 “This procedure is in accordance with the principle of objectivity requiring that the whole theory
and its interpretations have to be independent of the choice of the units of measurement. And
this requirement is met, if the theory is unit-free, the necessary condition stated in Buckingham’s
P-theorem.” (Schmiechen, 2009, p. 176)
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Relative prices are equal to the inverse relation of the outputs of both firms
multiplied with a factor that depends on the expenditure ratio for product1 which
is now complementary to the expenditure ratio for product2. For the special case
with total expenditures divided equally between the two products, i.e. rE1=0.5,
relative prices are equal to the inverse relation of the outputs. Or, as commonplace
economics always had it (Niehans, 1994, p. 15), the relatively abundant product is
cheap and the relatively scarce product is dear. If, on the other hand, outputs are
equal, then the relative price of product1 varies directly with the expenditure ratio
rE1.
Relative prices depend according to eq. (8) on the objective ratio of outputs,
i.e. on supply, and on the subjective partitioning of consumption expenditures,
i.e. on demand. Since we have from the standard theory of consumer demand the
marginalistic behavioral condition that the marginal rate of substitution MRS be
equal to the price ratio we are in the position to synthesize the structural formalism
and the marginalistic behavioral assumption. From the definition of the expenditure
ratio (5) follows:
ρE1
ρE2
=
C1
Y
C2
Y
=
P1X1
P2X2
|t (9)
When, by applying the rule MRS=P1/P2, the optimal quantities X1, X2 are deter-
mined in the usual way as coordinates of the tangential point of budget constraint
and indifference map then the optimal partitioning of consumption expenditures rE1,
rE2 is also determined. This implies that any configuration of expenditure ratios can
be formalized as a consumer optimum.
A straightforward result materializes as another limiting case if the labor inputs
of the two firms stand in the same proportion as the expenditures for both products:
P1
P2
=
R2
R1
if
L1
L2
=
C1
C2
and if ρX1 = ρX2 = 1 |t (10)
If labor input is allocated according to the consumers’ preferences, which are
revealed by their expenditures, then relative prices are inversely proportional to
the productivities in the two lines of production. Budget balancing is not required.
Neither are speculations about the shape of a hypothetical production function
required. The productivities in period t are measurable. We refer to this configuration
as the competitive structure. The purely deductive result coincides with ‘a doctrine
of the utmost importance in political economy’ (Ricardo, 1981, p. 13), according to
which ‘it is natural that what is usually the produce of two days or two hours labour,
should be worth double of what is usually the produce of one day’s or one hour’s
labour.’ (Smith, 2008, p 45). There is an alternative formulation of eq. (10) that
in combination with (2) formally embodies Adam Smith’s proposition (Robinson,
1981, pp. 30, 41):
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P1
P2
=
L∗1
L∗2
with L∗1 =
L1
O1
=
1
R1
|t (11)
The structural axiom set implies as a limiting case that relative prices are equal
to the ratio of labor inputs per unit of the respective output (cf. Niehans, 1994,
p. 89; Dmitriev, 1986, p. 81). In addition it implies the refutation of Jevons’s
sweeping critique of the classics. Jevons announced a new era of economic thinking
by arguing that authority, i.e. Smith, Ricardo and J. S. Mill, had been on the wrong
side and explained the nature of value by ‘infinitely small amounts of pleasure and
pain’ (Jevons, 1911, p. vii). But since the subjective partitioning of consumption
expenditures can always be expressed in marginalistic terms there is no contradiction
between the ‘Jevonian Law of Diminishing Utility’ (Dobb, 1973, p. 109) and the
classical labour theory of value in its most elementary form.
Let us summarize before we take profit into the picture. As a general structural
result which follows directly from the axioms one has for relative prices:
P1
P2
=
X2
X1
C1
C2
|t (12)
Expressed in ratios the structural value theorem takes these forms:
ρP =
ρX2 ρE1
ρX1 ρE2 ρL ρR
[i] =
ρE1
ρE2 ρL ρR
[ii] =
1
ρR
[iii] |t (13)
Real economies will most probably be found between market clearing [ii]
and the competitive structure [iii]. In the competitive structure solely organiza-
tion/technology stands in relation to relative prices. Neither pleasure and pain, nor
demand and supply, nor wages and profits play a role in this state. Whether the
budget is balanced or not is a matter of indifference. Obviously it does not follow
from the axiom set that this state is ‘natural’ and that the economy ‘gravitates’
toward it. This idea was an article of faith among the classics. Open to debate were
only the nature of profit and the relation between natural price and the natural rates
of wages, profit, and rent (Dobb, 1973, p. 44).
3 Profits and Wages
In the structural axiomatic context the business sector’s profit in period t is given
with eq. (14) as the difference between the sales revenues – for the economy as a
whole identical with consumption expenditures C – and costs – here identical with
wage income YF2:
2 Profits from changes in the value of non-financial assets are neglected here. One member of this
class is the stock of products which may change with regard to quantity and valuation price if the
product market is not cleared in successive periods. This case is excluded by the condition rX=1. For
the general case profit has to be introduced with the 5th axiom as the sum of financial and non-financial
profits.
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Q f i ≡C−YF |t (14)
In explicit form, after the substitution of (3) and (4), this definition is identical
with that of the theory of the firm:
Q f i ≡ PX−WL |t (15)
By applying the first axiom (1) and the definitions (4) and (5) one arrives at:
Q f i ≡C−Y +YD or Q f i ≡
(
ρE − 11+ρD
)
Y |t (16)
To get rid of all absolute magnitudes the profit ratio rQ is defined with eq. (17)
and this gives a succinct summary of the structural interrelation of the profit ratio,
the expenditure ratio, and the distributed profit ratio for the business sector as a
whole:
ρQ ≡ Q f iY ⇒ ρQ ≡ ρE −
1
1+ρD
|t (17)
The profit ratio for the business sector as a whole is positive if the expenditure
ratio rE is >1 or the distributed profit ratio rD is >0, or both. The determinants of
profit look essentially different depending on the perspective. For the firm price P,
quantity X, wage rate W, and employment L in eq. (15) seem to be all important;
under the broader perspective of eq. (16), which is formally equivalent, these
variables play no role at all. The profit definition provokes a cognitive dissonance
between the micro and the macro view that shall be dealt with at length in section 4.
The first question is how profits are distributed between the two firms. The
financial profit for each firm is given by:
Q f i1 = P1X1−W1L1 and Q f i2 = P2X2−W2L2 |t (18)
Using eq. (10) one gets for relative profits in the competitive structure:
Q f i1
Q f i2
=
1−
W1
P1R1
1− W2
P1R1
C1C2 if ρX1 = ρX2 = 1 |t (19)
If the wage rates in both firms are equal the numerical value in the brackets is
one and the ratio of profits is equal to the ratio of consumption expenditures for the
two products. From the purely formal standpoint it would suffice that the average
wage rates were equal. It is clear, however, that the differentiation of wage rates
within a firm would affect the partitioning of consumption expenditures. To keep
things simple, alternative distributions of wage rates within the firms are ruled out.
For the comparison of firms with different size and different absolute profits
the respective profit ratios are required. The profit ratio for the business sector as a
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whole (17) has been directly derived from the profit definition (14) and is adapted
for a single firm as follows:
ρQ ≡ Q f iY → ρQ1 ≡
Q f i1
W1L1
(20)
Using eq. (19) one gets for the relative profits ratios:
ρQ1
ρQ2
=
1
W1
− 1
P1R1
1
W2
− 1
P1R1
(21)
If the wage rates are equal the profitability of firms is equal. There is, though, no
such thing as a law of uniform profitability because there is nothing in the formalism
that equalizes the wage rates between firms. For the classics (Mill, 2006a, p. 472)
and even more so for Walras (Morishima, 1977, pp. 82-83) profit equalization was
self-evident. Of course, a formal proof of overall dynamic profit equalization could
not be delivered. The classics simply added the principle of perfect competition
to the principle of self-interest (Dmitriev, 1986, pp. 134-135) from where in due
time the general equilibrium emerged. This proliferation of more or less plausible
behavioral assumptions and the attendant loose verbal reasoning is not exactly what
the axiomatic method is all about.
If an equalizing mechanism exists it has to be separately identified and consis-
tently combined with the axiom set. The equality of wage rates and profitability
between the two firms is an additional formal property of the competitive production
structure and not a law-like necessity of the economic system. In fact, it is obviously
very improbable that this equality will be realized. This, however, does not affect
relative prices as given by eq. (10). For this limiting case therefore follows that the
structure of relative prices is independent from the equalization of profit ratios.
When the behavioral equilibrium among firms is defined as the equalization
of profit ratios then the behavioral equilibrium and the competitive structure are
at odds as long as wage rates are unequal. A reallocation of labor input does not
lead to the equalization of profit ratios, only the equalization of wage rate does.
Hence, if the firms’ behavioral repertoire is restricted to purely quantitative adaption
at given prices, the structural conditions ensure prolonged behavioral frustration.
Different profit ratios in different lines of production, though, do not jeopardize the
functioning of the system as a whole but must be taken as empirical normality. The
market economy can exist for an indefinite time without a behavioral equilibrium
but not without profits. That is the sine qua non. The economy needs either perfect
coordination or an adequate margin for erroneous decisions and counterproductive
behavior. The safety buffer that ensures a reasonable stability without perfect
coordination is provided by profit. The structural precondition of a positive profit
ratio for the economy as a whole is given with eq. (17). If the expenditure ratio rE
is unity and the distributed profit ratio rD is zero then the profit ratio for the business
sector is zero. If wage rates are not equal in this zero-profit economy the profit of
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one firm is equal to the loss of the other and this is not a comfortable situation in the
longer run. The axiomatic theory of profit is obviously fundamentally different from
both Ricardo’s ‘Corn Theory of Profit’ (Dobb, 1973, p. 70) and Mill’s abstinence
theory (Mill, 2006a, p. 481).
When in the simplest case market clearing and budget balancing is assumed
the only subjectively chosen variable is the expenditure ratio for one product. The
rest of the system is then determined by the conditions for the competitive structure.
If, in addition, the wage rates and the profit ratios in both firms are equal, no
improvements are possible, neither for the ‘workers’ nor for the ‘capitalists’. Thus,
one has a behavioral and allocative optimum. This configuration is consistent with
both the marginalistic theory of consumer optimum and the labour theory of value.
The optimal competitive structure can obviously be generalized for an arbitrary
number of firms and products. In marked contrast to the classical approach the
structural axiomatic approach asserts that a perfect competitive structure with all
desirable properties is possible but not that the economy will attain this state sooner
or later. This, though, is not a matter of primary concern. With regard to the proper
functioning of the market economy the critical condition is that the expenditure
ratio has to be greater than unity (if profit distribution is set aside for the moment)
because a zero-profit economy – Walras’s ‘ni bénéfice ni perte’ – is not reproducible
with more than one firm.
4 On Profits
It is of utmost importance that profit Q and distributed profit YD is clearly distin-
guished. The latter is a flow of income from the business to the household sector
analogous to wage income. By contrast, profit is the difference of flows within the
business sector. Profit is not connected to a factor input. So far we have labor input
as the sole factor of production and wage income as the corresponding factor remu-
neration. Since for now the factor capital is nonexistent profit cannot be assigned
to it in functional terms. And since profit cannot be counted as factor income (cf.
Knight, 2006, p. 308-309, Schumpeter, 2008, p. 153) there is no place for it in the
theory of income distribution. This would plainly be a category mistake.
The individual firm is blind to the structural relationship given by eq. (16). On
the firm’s level profit is therefore subjectively interpreted as a reward for innovation
or superior management skills or higher efficiency or toughness on wages or for
risk taking or capitalizing on market imperfections or as the result of monopolistic
practices. These factors play a role when it comes to the distribution of profits
between firms and these phenomena become visible when similar firms of an
industry are compared. Business does not ‘make’ profit; it redistributes profit.
Because of this it is not wise to take the individual firm as analytical starting-point
and then to generalize. The microeconomic approach is prone to the fallacy of
composition.
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The profit definition entails a cognitive dissonance between micro and macro,
but no logical contradiction. In the first place, that is, irrespective of the distribution
between individual firms total profit as a factor-independent residual (Ellerman,
1986, pp. 61-65) has nothing to do with price, costs, competition or any other factor
that is crucial to the individual firm’s management. The existence of total profit is
not explicable by the marginal principle.
Under the condition rE=1 profit Q must, as a corollary of eq. (16), be equal
to distributed profit YD. The fundamental difference between the two variables
is not an issue in this limiting case. The equality of profit and distributed profit
is an implicit feature of equilibrium models and of general equilibrium theory in
particular (Patinkin, 1989, p. 329), (Buiter, 1980, pp. 3, 7). These approaches
cannot find a counterpart in reality because profit and distributed profit are never
equal. Models that are based on the collapsed definition total income ≡ wages +
profits (cf. Keynes, 1973, p. 23, Kaldor, 1956, p. 95) are a priori unacceptable
because profit and distributed profit is not the same thing.
The classical notion of surplus stands in no relation to profit as determined
by (14). Neither is the neoclassical equilibrium condition, profit rate = marginal
productivity of capital, applicable in the pure consumption economy because we
have profit but no capital. And, since profit and capital cannot be treated like
Siamese Twins, as they have by the classics, the tendency of the profit rate to fall is
also in need of a thorough revision.
The simplest formula to express the relation between prices and cost of produc-
tion is:
price≥ cost of production per unit (22)
The classics rightly insisted on the common sense view that production cannot
continue for long if the price does not cover the costs and based their value theory on
this incontestable fact (Dmitriev, 1986, p. 63). Neither vital necessity nor wishful
thinking, though, makes profit to appear and therefore this view cannot explain
why profits are in fact positive over a longer time span. When condition (22) is
reformulated in structural axiomatic terms and somewhat tightened to exclude zero
profits we get condition [i]:
[i] ρF ≡ WPR < 1 ⇒ [ii] ρ (1+ρD)> 1 if ρX = 1 (23)
From the period core (6) then follows condition [ii] which states that the expen-
diture ratio has to be greater than unity and/or that the distributed profit ratio has
to be greater than zero and this condition may be referred to as the life-formula of
the pure consumption economy. This formula implies credit growth, at least over
some initial periods. For the business sector as a whole to make a profit consump-
tion expenditures C have in the simplest case, i.e. rD=0, to be greater than wage
income YF. So that profit comes into existence in the pure consumption economy
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the household sector must run at first a deficit. This in turn makes the inclusion of
the financial sector mandatory3.
It needs hardly emphasis that in the investment economy the process of profit
generation appears more complex. This does not affect the nature of profit. It simply
removes the formal necessity that the households have to run a deficit to get the
economy going. This is then done by the investing firms.
5 The Rate of Interest
Profit, interest, and rent posed some intricate problems for the labor theory of value
(Vianello, 2010). We have dealt with profit above and now include interest. This
also gives a clue of how to deal axiomatically with rent which is not considered
further here.
To simplify matters it is supposed that all financial transactions are carried out
without costs by the central bank. Money then takes the form of current deposits or
current overdrafts4. The central bank consists of two units, the transaction unit and
the banking unit that finances the households which in turn is the precondition for
consumption expenditures to be greater than income, i.e. for an expenditure ratio
rE>1. The output of the banking unit consists of the administrative services related
to a certain number of one-period loans as given by eq. (35), which is reproduced
here:
O2 = R2L2 |t (24)
The output’s dimension is loans processed per period. With regard to the pecu-
liarities of the banking business it is formally necessary to relate the administrative
services to the value of loans. With A, as specified by (49), the average value per
loan of the existing average stock of loans AVS2 (which in turn follows from the
cumulated overdrafts) is denoted:
O2A2 = (R2A2)L2 |t (25)
Equation (24) is rewritten as:
O∗2 = R
∗
2L2 |t (26)
The relation between the number of processed loans and the number of loans in the
banking unit’s books defines the stock-flow ratio rn:
3 When the purchase of long lived consumption goods, e.g. houses, is correctly subsumed under
consumption expenditures there arises no problem with regard to collateral for the banking industry
and a sound credit expansion may proceed for an indefinite time.
4 The cumulated amount of current deposits or overdrafts in period t can be directly derived from the
axiom set.
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ρn ≡ O2nS

l pr
period
lst
 ⇒ ρn ≡ 1[ 1period
]
if O2 = nS (27)
Here we make the simplifying assumption that the whole stock is processed in
each period which means that we make no distinction between new lending and the
administration of the already existing stock. In this case the ratio rn reduces to one
and carries only a dimension.
The households’ expenditures (43) consist now also of interest payments to the
banking unit. The flow of services bought X is taken to be equal to the output O* of
the banking unit. Under the condition of market clearing the expenditures are equal
to the interest payments (see eq. (50)):
C2 = (P2ρn)AV S2 = J2 AV S2 if ρX2 = 1 |t (28)
For the formal relation between the price P2 and the rate of interest follows:
P2ρn = J2
[
1
period
]
(29)
The rate of interest thereby inherits the role of the price.
If the production structure is competitive then for relative prices holds:
P1
P2
=
R∗2
R1
if ρX1 = ρX2 = 1 |t (30)
Substituting eq. (29) relative prices, here the relation of product price P to the
rate of interest J, are finally given by:
P1
J2
=
R2
R1
A2
ρn
⇒ J2 = R1R2
(
ρn
A∗2
)
if ρX1 = ρX2 = 1; A∗2 ≡
A2
P1
|t (31)
The loan interest rate J is equal to the ratio of the productivity in the consumption
goods producing firm1and of the productivity in the banking unit. The latter is
weighted with the deflated average loan value. In the competitive structure the
interest rate is therefore equal to a relation of real variables. When the average loan
value A2 and the price P1 always move in lockstep (as they do with perfect indexing
of the nominal value of the loans), there is no effect on the rate of interest other than
productivity changes. If they do not, the rate of interest and the price are positively
related
J2 =
(
R1
R2
ρn
A2
)
P1 if ρX1 = ρX2 = 1 |t (32)
and we have to differentiate between a nominal and real rate of interest (a
phenomenon we cannot go deeper into here). The loans are produced like any other
good and the interest rate therefore truly reflects the production conditions in the
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respective industries. The rate of interest fits consistently in the labor theory of
value.
The two functions of the central bank, transaction on the one hand (which
has been assumed here to be costless) and the processing of one-period loans on
the other, are neatly separated. The banking unit is the conceptual nucleus of the
commercial banking industry and has eventually to be spun off from the central
bank.
The financial profit of the business sector as a whole in period t is derived from
the profit definition (15) and eq. (28) as:
Q f i = P1X1−W1L1+ J2 AV S2−W2L2 |t (33)
In the competitive structure the banking unit’s profit ratio is equal to the produc-
tion firm’s profit ratio if the wage rates are equal. The banking unit earns its living
like any other firm.
The salient point is that the (loan) rate of interest is not some kind of reward
for abstinence or waiting but the price for the services of the banking unit. It is
basically not different from any other price that the households pay for any other
goods and services.
The classics did not properly discriminate between the rate of interest and the
profit rate (Niehans, 1994, p. 97) and maintained that profits are ‘an element in Cost
of Production, in so far as they are spread over unequal lengths of time’ (Mill, 2006a,
p. 482). Profits are no costs of production as we have seen in section 2 but interests
can be when the business sector finances its operations with loans from the central
bank. These interests for the working capital cancel out for the business sector as a
whole and determine only the distribution of profits between the production firms
and the central bank. Mill’s notion of profit, although erroneous from the vantage
point of the structural axiom set, is realistic given the circumstances of his time
when the roles of entrepreneur, owner, and financier fell into one. Nevertheless, he
applied only parochial realism which is the defining characteristic of partial analysis.
The classical capitalist’s roles have to be separated analytically and reconfigured
in the general axiomatic context. This has been done; what remains to be done
is, of course, the inclusion of ‘commodities made by machinery’. Without a full
understanding of the elementary consumption economy, though, there is no chance
of grasping the complexities of capital accumulation and their implications for the
theory of value.
6 Can it be True?
From the differentiated axiom set follows for the competitive structure that the
exchange ratio for two products is equal to the inverse productivity ratio (10).
Since this statement has been deductively derived it is a theorem. A theorem is
different from a law in that it does not make any deterministic claim about real
world phenomena. Thus the structural value theorem does not suggest that there
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exist market ‘forces’ that make it inevitably true ‘in the long run’ or ‘on the average’.
Nevertheless, it may turn out to be applicable to the real world like the Pythagorean
Theorem.
First of all it is important to recall that we deal at the moment with a pure
consumption economy. That is: no taxes, no foreign trade, no investment goods
industry, and no secondary market for durable consumer goods (Ricardo’s rare
statues and peculiar wines). Second, the axiomatic value theorem holds but for
the product market. In fact the theorem says nothing at all about the labor market,
therefore it is a matter of indifference whether the economy is in full employment or
not. It does not matter either whether the economy experiences inflation or deflation.
In the limiting case of the competitive structure the price relations reflect solely the
state of organization/technology.
The conditions for the application of the axiomatic value theorem constitute an
elementary consumption economy and are plausible in this restricted domain. They
allow for the following conditional prediction. If the allocation of the labor input
between firms reflects the preferences of the consumers, as it ideally should with
efficient markets, then the exchange ratios of the products are equal to the respective
inverse productivity ratios. If the preconditions are approximately realized then
we should observe a relatively stable price structure that reflects the productivity
development in different industries5. Independently of this we should find that
the general relation (13) always holds exactly, that is, within the boundaries of
measurement errors. In other words, it holds by virtue of pure deduction. What
does that mean?
For a general answer let us briefly return to the Pythagorean Theorem. With
a known baseline and two known angles one can calculate the unknown and not
directly measurable distance to the moon. In physics a theorem is used as a cal-
culating device (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, p. 332). The usefulness of theorems is
beyond question.
The application of a theorem, however, implicitly introduces a new claim. The
first claim is that the Pythagorean Theorem is true1, i.e. formally correct. By
applying it to calculate the distance to the moon it is tacitly assumed that earth and
moon are located in Euclidean space which is quite another claim that may or may
not be true2. While true1 refers to the axioms, true2 refers to reality. Only when the
properties of the space that is formally given with the axioms happen to be those of
real space the calculation of the distance will yield the correct result. By innocently
applying the Pythagorean Theorem we therefore implicitly make the really strong
claim that the Euclidean axioms capture reality. If this happens to be the case, and
as far as we know it does in the earth’s vicinity, then true1 and true2 amalgamate to
true0. Under the condition that the general structural value theorem is true0 it can
5 “Summarizing [the interrelations for Germany], we may conclude that relative productivity growth
is the most important determinant of relative price growth, where causality may run the other way as
well . . . , but there is no proportional relation between the variables.” (Rahmeyer, 1988, p. 229)
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readily be applied as a calculating device that enables valid inferences from known
facts to unknown facts.
7 Summary and Conclusions
Behavioral assumptions, rational or otherwise, are not solid enough to be eligible
as first principles of theoretical economics. Hence all endeavors to lay the formal
foundation on a new site and at a deeper level actually need no further vindication.
The present paper suggests three non-behavioral axioms that comprise ten measur-
able variables as groundwork for the formal reconstruction of the evolving money
economy.
This paper has two parts. In the first, the logical interdependencies of the key
variables that formally embody the firm, the market, and the income distribution are
developed. In the second, the real world implications for the theory of value are
made explicit.
The analytical priority claim of the structural axiomatic approach rests on the
simple fact that, since the structure that is given by the axiom set does not adapt to
behavior, behavior has to adapt to structure. If behavioral and structural logic are at
odds behavioral logic is conductive to frustrated plans and expectations. That is the
normal state of economic affairs.
The main results of the axiomatic inquiry are:
• Although Mill propagated the axiomatic method, he actually neither formal-
ized the fundamental behavioral principle nor the theory of value. Hence Mill
offers a starting point for both behavioral and structural axiomatization.
• From the differentiated structural axiom set follows the general value theorem
which is independent of behavioral hypotheses.
• The competitive production structure as a limiting case of the value theorem
is characterized by an allocation of total working hours in exact proportion
to the assignment of consumption expenditures to different products and
epitomizes the consumers’ optimum.
• Given a competitive structure, relative prices are equal to the inverse ratio
of productivities. This configuration is consistent with both the marginalist
theory of the consumer optimum and the classical labour theory of value.
• Under the additional condition that the wage rates are equal between firms
the profit ratios are equal, too.
• Profit is not attributable to capital in the pure consumption economy. Profit is
a factor independent residual that is determined by the expenditure ratio and
the distributed profit ratio.
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• In the structural axiomatic context the (loan) rate of interest is not some
kind of reward for abstinence or waiting but the price for the loan processing
services of the banking system.
• Profit is no part of the costs of production as Mill maintained. The profit ratio
is qualitatively different from the rate of interest.
The general structural axiomatic approach retroactively provides Mill’s missing
axioms and fits the classical approach consistently into a much broader context.
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Appendix
Differentiation of the axiom set (1) to (3) for period t:
Y =W1L1+D1N1+W2L2+D2N2 (34)
O1 = R1L1 O2 = R2L2 (35)
C = P1X1+P2X2 (36)
YF1 =W1L1 YF2 =W2L2 (37)
YD1 = D1N1 YD2 = D2N2 (38)
Y1 = YF1+YD1 Y2 = YF2+YD2 (39)
YF = YF1+YF2 (40)
YD = YD1+YD2 (41)
L = L1+L2 (42)
C1 = P1X1 C2 = P2X2 (43)
ρE1 ≡ C1Y ρE2 ≡
C2
Y
ρE ≡ CY ⇒ ρE ≡ ρE1+ρE2 (44)
ρX1 ≡ X1O1 ρX2 ≡
X2
O2
(45)
ρD1 ≡ YD1YF1 ρD2 ≡
YD2
YF2
ρD ≡ YDYF (46)
ρF1 ≡ W1P1R1 ρF2 ≡
W2
P2R2
(47)
Axioms and definitions are consolidated to the period core for two firms:
ρF1 ρE1 (1+ρD1)
ρX1
+
ρF2 ρE2 (1+ρD2)
ρX2
= 1 (48)
Definition and Derivation in section 5:
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A2 ≡ average value of stock of loansnumber of loans in stock ≡
AV S2
nS
[
C
lst
]
(49)
C2 = P2X2 = P2O∗2 = P2O2A2 = P2ρnnS
AV S2
nS
= J2 AV S2 if ρX2 = 1 (50)
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